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In their second contribution to the volume, the authors review the implementation
of rural development planning in the two island jurisdictions of the Republic of Ire-
land and the province of Newfoundland and Labrador. The emphasis in this contri-
bution is the application of theory about “ruralness,” governance, and regional
development and their relevance for attempts to create and implement rural devel-
opment policy and programs in the two island jurisdictions. Local flexibility/auton-
omy and access to sufficient resources are highlighted as particularly important
considerations in rural development success. The chapter continues the emphasis
on detailed comparative analysis as a means to uncover similarities and differ-
ences in the societies, as well as governance initiatives, with an eye to extracting
relevant lessons that can be shared.
INTRODUCTION
OUR EARLIER CHAPTER in this volume deals with two of the most fundamental is-
sues in contemporary rural development, namely policy approaches and territorial
constructs. It looks at how various layers and structures within the state (central and
regional) have shaped the macro context within which rural development operates
in a particular Canadian and in the Irish rural contexts. It observes how funding ar-
rangements, institutional layers, and policy milieus have become more complex
and formalized in both places. This chapter builds on the earlier analysis in Chapter
4. It begins by outlining the relevance of governance processes in area-based rural
development. It then looks at how various structures and initiatives in Newfound-
land and Labrador and in Ireland aspire to and/or give effect to principles and prac-
tices of governance. The chapter concludes by drawing out some lessons on
promoting multi-level governance and the co-ordination of efforts at the local level
for rural development.
GOVERNANCE
In this chapter, we do not attempt to encapsulate the broad-based discourse sur-
rounding the concept of governance. Stoker’s comment that “governance is ulti-
mately concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective
action” captures the essence of the concept (Stoker, 1998: 17). The salient charac-
teristics of governance systems and episodes include shared power contexts involv-
ing various combinations of actors and institutions from government, the private
sector, non-governmental organizations, and other elements in civil society in
fluid, horizontal relationships.
These arrangements are often highly instrumental, sometimes informal, in-
volve blurred boundaries in responsibility and authority, and are more like custom-
ized collaborative networks than formal hierarchically defined structures (Rhodes,
1996). They contrast with and, indeed, are seen to largely replace the conventional
formalized and often bureaucratic government-based arrangements that clearly re-
flected an unquestioned set of power relationships based on authority, sanctions,
and exclusive access to strategic resources. Here the emphasis shifts from “power
over” to the pragmatics of “power to”; novel, fluid, and at times unconventional
partnerships and coalitions are formed to facilitate agency. Much of this is associ-
ated with the rise of neo-liberalism, the resurgence of the market as the optimal in-
stitution for the most efficient and efficacious allocation of public resources and
public policy, and the so-called demise of the welfare state. On this basis gover-
nance is interpreted as a process through which government can find a way to exer-
cise some power, as its quota of power and legitimacy diminishes, while at the same
time sharing some powers and accessing others as it engages civil society and pri-
vate interests through various forms of participatory process.
Through these more fluid, contextually responsive arrangements compliance
can be negotiated, locally autonomy can be incorporated in the process and out-
comes, operating codes can be learned and crafted through the process itself, and in
the recognition of pervasive uncertainty, more opportunistic, flexible, and adapt-
able strategies formulated and implemented. Governance as a concept and an orga-
nizing framework, within “a new topography of political relations,” is seen to have
considerable purchase in rural development (e.g., Marsden et al., 1993; Marsden
and Murdoch, 1998; Giguère, 2002).
However, the concept of governance remains nascent, still emerging amid a
somewhat disjointed and far-flung discourse. Not surprisingly, its application is not
accepted as either universal or unquestioned (Day, 1998; Murdoch and Abram,
1998; Douglas, 2005). Even some of its earliest formulators alert us to the paucity
of cause-effect constructs and to the degree to which governance may simply be
code for ideological positions relating to less government and the pre-eminence of
the market (Stoker, 1998).
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Notwithstanding the above, we look to the concept of governance as a short-
hand formulation of pragmatic organizational and process constructions designed
to get things done in rural contexts, where there is not only complexity and some
uncertainty regarding real power and agency, but where instrumental power rela-
tions are negotiated in situ, and embedded in the context and in the relations be-
tween players on hand. Governance is a concept that attempts to make sense, after
the fact, of innovative but practical organizational, resource allocation, and process
arrangements that temporarily override established power and hierarchical formal-
ities and focus on commonly accepted means to commonly desired ends. Consider-
able evidence of these adaptive behaviours can be found in rural development in
different parts of the world today.
GOVERNANCE, PLACE, AND DEVELOPMENT
The issue of governance and the sustainability of governance arrangements are
central to any efforts at area-based development. Place and space have emerged as
highly significant drivers and determinants of development, including rural devel-
opment (Peet and Hartwick, 1999). The merits of spatially or territorially based ap-
proaches over traditional sectoral and often disjointed approaches to development
have been well-argued and demonstrated (OECD, 2001; Gardiner et al., 2004;
Kitson et al., 2004). At the EU level the realization of the Lisbon and Gothenburg
objectives1 is predicated on a strong territorial approach. Policies, such as the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy (CAP), which traditionally were sectorally oriented, now
reflect a greater territorial approach. Regional development now attracts greater fi-
nancial allocations than was previously the case and economic policies are framed
within the context of territorial cohesion. The European Spatial Development Per-
spective, agreed by member states in 1999, provides a framework for national, re-
gional, and sub-regional territorial development approaches that are based on a
polycentric approach (networking and complementarities between a number of
functional centres, rather than agglomerations), inter-regional collaboration, and
greater linkages between urban and rural territories. The attainment and mainte-
nance of territorial competitiveness require high levels of inter-sectoral and
inter-institutional networking and collaboration, so that development is increas-
ingly based on valorizing and enhancing local resources and features, rather than
relying on external or top-down interventions that have generally failed to deliver
rural development objectives.
The transition from sectoral to territorial or area-based approaches can be de-
fined in terms of a metamorphosis of how power is structured, distributed, man-
aged, and legitimized. It may be viewed in terms of a transition from systems of
government to systems of governance, where government embodies top-down or
hierarchical power structures, and where agents operate without specific reference
to others or to the spatial context within which they operate. Such systems are gen-
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erally characterized by a lack of flexibility and spatial differentiation, or a “one size
fits all” approach. On the other hand, territorial systems of governance prioritize
the spatial over the sectoral, and seek to encourage and enable collaboration and
joint actions between agents. Governance arrangements and the ensuing actions
will invariably vary from one location to the next, but often are characterized by
high levels of participation by local citizenry, a degree of flexibility in decision-
making and resource allocation processes, the capacity to respond to local needs
and opportunities, and the embodiment of top-down and bottom-up approaches to
development.
It should be emphasized that governance does not guarantee or presume a spa-
tial dimension to rural development. Even if public administrative or other discrete
policy “silos” are breached and bridged through shared power and other pragmatic
governance relationships, there may be little reference to, yet alone any harnessing
of the fundamental territorial dimension of rural development process and practice.
The governance dynamic will be played out in space, with the spatial dimension
relatively passive; it will not operationalize the attributes of the place itself as a stra-
tegic active factor in the development process. It will not be place-based develop-
ment. However, approaching rural development from the start from the spatial or
territorial perspective inevitably fosters and facilitates horizontal governance rela-
tionships and behaviours. The “silos” become secondary. With the emphasis on
people in place, as the subjects as well as the objects of the development process,
the separations associated with sectors and organizational power bases are vari-
ously devalued and eroded. They become less relevant; the interrelationships be-
tween them that serve to develop the space are valued and accorded attention. So,
the complex relationship between governance and space might be summarized as
one where a spatial or territorial perspective may create the necessary conditions
for governance, but not the sufficient conditions, or where governance relation-
ships can be fostered with little reference to the spatial or territorial dimension of
rural development.
As the following diagrammatic presentation of governance concepts illus-
trates (Figure 12.1), governance structures occupy a space between elected or rep-
resentative government and participative government, where participative
government refers to citizens collectively organizing and undertaking specific pro-
jects and/or initiatives. Thus, governance combines elements of the top-down and
bottom-up, and it provides a forum where representatives of both can come to-
gether to promote agreed-on strategies. Such strategies are based on formal or pre-
scribed rules that generally emanate from the top down (as the policy and
institutional contexts described in the previous chapter) and informal or more flexi-
ble bottom-up approaches that allow variations within and between locales to be
taken into account.
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Figure 12.1: The Concept of Governance
Relations between Government and Governance in an incremental process
Source: ESPON (2006).
Governance arrangements in rural development imply a genuine effort to in-
clude the citizenry continuously in decision-making and, as the case study insights
from Newfoundland and Labrador and Ireland in this chapter illustrate, a number of
platforms have been created at the sub-regional level to enable citizens to feed into
decision-making. Some of these democratic experiments have been more success-
ful than others.
One of the more significant challenges for governance structures is the attain-
ment of information-sharing and subsequent collaboration between agents, partic-
ularly those in the public sector. As a consequence of experiencing the transition
from government to governance, individuals more often find themselves interfac-
ing horizontally with and referring to locally based coalitions or partnerships rather
than relating vertically to government bureaucracy. Governance structures also are
challenged to ensure co-ordination between sectors, so that agencies operate as
partners, pool resources, and contribute to the attainment of territorial competitive-
ness.
Given the backdrop on the evolution of rural development policy in New-
foundland and Labrador and Ireland, as presented in the Chapter 4, and the mandate
and expectations of the Regional Economic Development Boards (REDBs) and the
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Irish LEADER and APC organizations, what are the prospects and potentials for gov-
ernance? A number of challenges may be suggested at this time to gauge the gover-
nance milieu.
NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR:
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES IN GOVERNANCE
The REDBs operate under conditions generic to so many organizations active in ru-
ral development; they are, in effect, “creatures of the province” — to borrow a term
from Canadian public administration. While they have in one of their roots the in-
digenous and robust inheritances of the Regional Development Associations
(RDAs), which should provide some institutional ballast, their roles are both spa-
tially and functionally much more diverse and demanding than the RDAs. More to
the point, the REDBs have been brought into being since 1996 through the commit-
ment and initiatives of the province. Their existence essentially is premised on the
interest and commitment of the province.
Related to provincial interest and commitment, the resources and the remit of
the REDBs are directly influenced by the vagaries of federal-provincial relations and
those individual and/or joint interests in and commitment to rural development. As
they shift from time to time, the operating environment for the REDBs shifts.
Keeping abreast of these shifts, decoding their implications, and availing their dis-
tricts of the opportunities (if any) they provide are significant challenges for the
volunteer-based Boards. And the Boards are subject to information availability,
communications processes, and negotiations in a vastly asymmetrical three-way
partnership.
As already noted, the functional effectiveness of the REDBs is directly related
to the nature of their relationships with departments and agencies associated with
particular projects (e.g., aquaculture, hiking trails). These are unabashedly instru-
mental relationships developed for the purposes of funding, preferences, and per-
haps competitive positioning. More often than not the REDBs are active in a zero
sum external investment recruitment process among one another within their home
province of Newfoundland and Labrador.
A culture of “grantsmanship” is perpetuated across two levels of government,
and a changing roster of programs and projects, as well as personalities. The REDBs
may swivel from a predominantly economic development agenda, as per their man-
date, towards one focusing more on social development. This appears to have been
the case for many boards in the recent past. This drift in focus and core activities
may have been fuelled by such factors as Human Resources and Skills Develop-
ment Canada’s (HRSDC) energetic re-entry into the broader field of social develop-
ment, and the associated availability of significant sums for projects. This
refocusing, in turn, may have been augmented by local pressures to address specific
and very visible community development issues in the REDBs’ territories (such as
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education and social welfare), and the attractive constituency capital to be gained
from addressing these in a concrete and timely manner (Strategic Partnership Study
Group, 2002).
As regional economic development is central to the role and relevance of the
REDBs, the continuing questions remain regarding resources (i.e., capital) and the
related one: the breadth of their mandate. A consistent response to the question of
the core mandate of the REDBs evokes the terms “lead, facilitate, and co-ordinate.”
But questions of capital and mandate are not confined to the challenging process of
preparing, updating, and maintaining the regional strategic plan. As we have seen,
they go beyond the plan into implementation, co-ordination, and the local eco-
nomic development process itself. Access to capital and securing the provision of
investment and business development services (BDS) are generally accepted as piv-
otal factors in rural economic development. Without the capital resources in place,
unlike the oft-mentioned Community Capital Corporation concept, the REDBs face
a particularly onerous challenge.
Related to this central issue is the parallel role, and potentially competitive
functions, of the Community Business Development Corporations (CBDCs). With
their business development functions as integral components of the organizations,
the CBDCs could potentially be the most potent partner in the actual implementation
of the REDB’s strategic development plan. The degree to which an intensive opera-
tional integration between the CBDCs and the REDBs has taken place is uncertain, but
does not seem to be common. How might the REDB ensure that the CBDC is support-
ive of its business development and related investment priorities? And how can the
CBDC’s own investment support priorities be made sensitive to and indeed serve to
reinforce the REDB’s strategic agenda?
In contrast to what seems to be strong participation by the municipal sector in
the REDBs, the presence of the business community is often reported to have fallen
short of expectations. The earlier period of board formation (e.g., 1996-9) saw a
considerable and vigorous pattern of participation by most of the regional business
communities across the province. With some exceptions, this appears to have di-
minished. The causes for this are likely many and varied (e.g., a decline in motiva-
tion after the initial intensive strategic planning phase, inadequate succession
planning, volunteer fatigue). However, a growing gap appears to be evident here.
Given the centrality of the economic development facilitation and co-ordination
function of the REDBs, and the expectation for them to provide leadership here, this
thinning out of the partnership base poses some very significant challenges.
The recent announcement of the formation of a Rural Secretariat and the instal-
lation of nine regional boards and staff support across the province may exacerbate
what is already a complex and at times confusing development organizational land-
scape. With the CBDC areas, the REDB regions (zones), many other federal and pro-
vincial administrative regions, and now another regional template with, by all
accounts, considerable political investment underpinning it, Fuchs’s spectre of the
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“crowded kitchen” looms large (Fuchs, 1995: 53). Not unlike many other contexts
(e.g., Ireland), clarification is certainly required as the current situation not only
generates some uncertainty regarding the mandate and viability of the REDBs, but
also complicates their leading, facilitating, and co-ordinating remit.
The resourcing of the REDBs is a significant challenge, not unlike that faced by
most rural volunteer-based organizations. The support now provided by the Execu-
tive Directors and the Economic Development Officers should enhance a sense of
continuity and the abilities of the boards to focus on longer-term development strat-
egies, and especially capacity development in the region and the region’s commu-
nities and organizations. It will be important for the boards to effectively recruit the
appropriate roster of volunteers from time to time to respond to its changing eco-
nomic development agenda, and the REDB’s emerging strategic priorities (such as
agri-tourism, home-based business, new telecommunications enterprises, and
niche value-added food-processing). This calls for the appropriate organizational
bylaws to facilitate volunteer turnover and cyclical re-resourcing of the board, as
priorities change. It also calls for an organizational culture that critically scrutinizes
its own volunteer management process. This is especially important as the REDBs
focus on structural change in their regions, capacity-building, and longer-term stra-
tegic directions, in contrast to a preoccupation with shorter-term projects and re-
lated government transfers that characterized earlier development modalities in the
province.
The nurturing of partnerships and the development of governance systems is
not independent of the participant’s development record to date. And after almost
10 years the record for the REDBs is mixed. Conventional indicators such as jobs
created, jobs retained, new businesses started, new commercial investment,
re-skilling of the regional labour force, and related measures do not furnish a sub-
stantial record of success across the system of REDBs. Several exceptions where
substantial business development occurred have been recorded. In addition, the
Boards’ activities in business retention and expansion have been a high-profile and
generally well-received initiative. Given the relatively short period of
post-planning development implementation activity for some Boards (e.g,.
2000-6), concrete expectations on these counts may be premature. In addition,
much of the REDBs’ activities have been related to strategic information generation
(such as research and surveys), building collaborative networks and partnerships,
getting the Board as a volunteer organization underway, and selected project pro-
motion and implementation (such as rural tourism and hatcheries). Some observers
see the major outcome of the REDBs’ activities to date as a structural shift in the de-
velopment culture in Newfoundland and Labrador; a positive change away from di-
rect (government) dependency and project opportunism towards subsidiarity,
longer-term development, development capacity-building, and greater local
self-determination.
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However one views the record, the question of attribution (i.e., the net effect
directly associated with the REDB’s participation) has to be addressed. All of this,
therefore, does pose a challenge for the REDBs. To be even-handed any assessment
here will require a candid and critical reflection on the expectations of all parties in
this innovative enterprise, and a realistic scrutiny of the resources invested by all
parties. Ensuring that all interests subscribe to the investments in the REDBs as
seed-bedding investment, investments that are generative for longer-term struc-
tural change, both in terms of development outcomes (e.g,. participation in the new
information economy) and in terms of the development process (e.g., net-
work-building), will be one of the greatest political challenges for the REDBs and
their constituencies.
RESPONDING TO THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND
LABRADOR THROUGH GOVERNANCE
Taking the nascent concept of governance as a conceptual framework we may en-
visage the REDB story as an overlapping four-phase process (Figure 12.2).
Each of these phases has to be viewed in the complex three-/four-way interac-
tive spaces suggested in Figure 4.2. Each phase is played out within a three- or
four-dimensional space, an interest surface of agents and organizations interacting
with varying degrees of intensity and longevity with other agents and organiza-
tions, all embedded in the prevailing institutional milieu. These transactional
spaces (e.g., between communities, sectoral interests, federal and/or provincial
government agencies) differ in terms of the activity agenda and the dominant play-
ers involved.
The formation phase, from 1996 on, involves intensive activities drawing on
established networks (e.g., via the RDAs) and creating new ones. It also involves ex-
tensive discussions, formal and informal surveys, explorations regarding the issues
on hand, and many other matters, as well as the appropriate interests to involve in
the new development organization, the REDB. Processes of negotiation are central
here. This phase and the following phase are redolent of the conceptualization by
Bryson and Crosby (1996) of the planning process as one involving “forums, are-
nas and courts.” Central to the extended conversations in the formation phase, and
especially in the REDB’s planning and design phase, are the creation and communi-
cation of meaning, which is done through social practice and via what Giddens
(1984) has called principles of “signification.” Interpretative schemes are used that
draw on participants’ bedrock principles of language and world views. In this first
phase “power over” has to be confronted. The instrumental dynamic is designed to
communicate, convince, and negotiate the anticipated net benefits of a potential
“power with” regarding some contributions and perhaps concessions from those
with a real or assumed “power over.” The negotiation is designed to persuade all
parties in the enterprise of a potential collective capacity that may be achieved, with
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attendant future benefits, which at the same time is achieved without, at a mini-
mum, significantly compromising the power bases of the collaborators. So, this for-
mative phase is one where seeking attention, retaining attention, and exercising
influence (i.e., buy-in) are fundamental. We are familiar with this process as “com-
municative action” (Forester, 1989). As a critical time of aspirations and expecta-
tions it is a phase in the development process of leveraging available social
(bonding) capital through community, professional, and other networks, while at
the same time investing in bridging social capital for expanded alliances and col-
laborators (Gittel and Vidal, 1998).
Figure 12.2: Governance and the REDBs: Complexities and Challenges through
Four Overlapping Phases
The overlapping planning and design phase also involves extensive communi-
cation through research, workshops, meetings, and related activities. Here “prob-
lem framing” is a central activity (Schön, 1978). What are the central issues to be
addressed here? What is meant by “rural economic development”? What are the
principal threats and liabilities that have to be faced? Where are the current devel-
opment trends taking the regions? What are people’s visions for their region? What
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are the relevant goals, objectives, and development priorities? What are the strate-
gic alternatives for development? What is the required action agenda, and who are
the key players? Here the challenge of seeking and getting the attention of the rural
region’s residents and organizations shifts from organizational development to
policy priorities and an action agenda. This involves once again selected claims to
attention, and hence potentially formative processes of communicative action (For-
ester, 1989). Development strategies are crafted and formally approved. In this for-
mal decision-making phase, analogous to Bryson and Crosby’s “use of arenas,”
bedrock principles of “domination” are evident in the unequal distributions of re-
sources, access, power in making and enforcing generative rules, and power in
transformative relations. These all are in play here. The planning and design phase
is extremely important for the development planner, one where power to influence
if not shape much of the agenda (i.e., what gets attention, what does not) can be ex-
ercised.
The next phase, once initiated, permeates all REDB activities and involves a va-
riety of intentional strategies and tactics to reinforce the organization’s relevance,
credibility, and legitimacy. Much of this conceptualizing would already have been
achieved by visible and broadcasted success in development project approvals and
funding (see below), particularly in concrete evidence of positive development out-
comes (e.g., new jobs, jobs retained, new industrial and commercial investment,
new physical infrastructure). This maintenance and sustaining phase might have a
period of intensive activity (e.g., in pre-empting a hiatus after the celebrated adop-
tion of the REDB’s strategic plan), but may also be seen as a “vertical” phase that
effectively intersects all others. The sustaining phase involves continuing commu-
nicative action to address power centres that remain threatened, or are otherwise re-
luctant partners in the development networks. At the same time, the tasks of
persuading flagging partners (or doubting potential partners) that the route to
“power to” is via processes that will generate “power with” receive concerted atten-
tion here. This phase parallels the centrality of creating solidarity in community de-
velopment. Maintenance activities include succession planning and volunteer
recruitment for the Board itself, reporting back to and negotiating activities with the
formally enlisted organizations and other Board members, and publicity and pro-
motion. It may also involve formal acknowledgements and recognition of various
partners’ contributions, community celebrations, and other reinforcing initiatives.
Educational and other media activities, briefing and securing the commitment of
provincial and federal politicians, and many other activities will be part of this on-
going phase.
Furthermore, this phase also involves what Bryson and Crosby (1996: 474-5)
refer to as the “management of residual conflict” through the concept of “courts.”
Societal norms are enforced; appeal is made to formally agreed-on accords (e.g.,
the adopted Strategic Economic Plan) and to other records of understandings and
entitlements. Bridging and bonding social capital is drawn on, and sanctions are
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variously applied. In this regulative environment attempts to manage, or at least to
control some elements of conduct are evident. Bedrock moral or evaluative stan-
dards or logics are called on and applied as social principles of “legitimation.”
The fourth phase involves the identification of individual projects, discus-
sions, multi-party agreements, formal proposals, a variety of protocols and negotia-
tions, approvals, and secured resource allocations. For many this is the core activity
of the REDBs and the acid test of the relevance of these development organizations
and of the planning and related investments involved. Clearly, this phase is where
the wherewithal of the alliances, liaisons, partnerships and networks is put to the
test. Political capital, communications power, personal persuasion, the credibility
of the analytical argument, leverage that the REDB might access and use, and many
other facets of the organization’s resources are on call here. The purported instru-
mental sequence — the purported results chain that is supposed to emanate from
collective and negotiated investments in “power with,” to concrete outputs mani-
festing “power to” — is taken to task here. The fluidity and blurring of jurisdic-
tional boundaries that the partners subscribed to (with some risk) and the shifts in
instrumental power that these involved will be re-examined here for productive re-
sults. The promissory notes are due. Success in this phase reinforces the REDB’s in-
vestments in sustaining and maintaining the organization and its mandate.
Likewise, it may serve to allay fears or some erosion of credibility evident among
the Board members, and/or their partners in and beyond the region. Legitimacy is
reinforced through the “deliverables” and at least some conflict is obviated or ame-
liorated. The investment in governance is justified, or otherwise.
The profile of successes here can, of course, serve to reproduce the pattern of
power relations prevailing in the region, and thereby further embed privilege and
hegemony. On the other hand, the purposeful design and promotion of a particular
roster of development projects (e.g., to mentor networks for lower-income enter-
prise start-ups) may reduce power imbalances evident in patterns of social exclu-
sion and structural disadvantage. The profiling of projects, and the attendant
investment in carefully designing them, promoting them, and securing their ap-
proval and resources, is directly dependent on success in negotiated governance ar-
rangements.
Inserting these four overlapping phases into the complex three-part (and likely
four-part) transaction surfaces mentioned in our earlier chapter (see Figure 4.2),
one can envisage a particularly complex and challenging operational milieu. One
can envisage the “curves” of legitimacy, credibility, resources acquisition, partici-
patory engagement, social capital, leverage potentials, political impact, organiza-
tional capacity, concrete effects (e.g., facilitated employment growth), and so on,
moving up and down and interactively over time through these phases. As concrete
“deliverables” are attributed to the REDB’s initiatives, credibility and, therefore, le-
gitimacy may grow. As funding stalls in the intergovernmental labyrinth, participa-
tion might plateau and wane. As matters stagnate, the municipal partners might
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assume much of the co-ordination leadership in the process. As the Board exerts in-
fluence on the CBDC’s investment agenda, more broad-based impacts might be evi-
dent and the organization’s capital in the region commensurately enhanced, and so
on. The Boards operate in a very complex, dynamic relational milieu and there are
complex and, as yet, poorly understood interrelationships between progress
through these four overlapping phases and the transactional dynamics that are cen-
tral to the REDB’s co-ordination and facilitation mandate.
The still-evolving concept of governance provides a useful lens to view the
formation and activity profile of Newfoundland and Labrador’s Regional Eco-
nomic Development Boards. It may be applied to the establishment and functioning
of the REDBs when conceptualized in these four overlapping phases. Structures and
behaviours associated with the concept of governance are clearly in evidence; in-
deed, the concept may be seen as a structural element cutting across and linking all
four overlapping phases — governance modalities are of the essence here. When
combined with Bryson and Crosby’s conceptualization of the planning and man-
agement process via “forums, arenas and courts,” and Forester’s use of critical the-
ory for communicative action in the planning process, these aspects of governance
throw further light on some of the nuances of the functioning of these organizations
and on the many challenges they face.
NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR: SUMMARY
Our review of some of the challenges currently facing and likely to be before the
Regional Economic Development Boards in Newfoundland and Labrador suggests
that the concept of governance has some purchase here, and that there are two broad
areas for future attention. The first is the overarching mandate for these innovative
development organizations. The second relates to some of the characteristics of this
elusive concept we call “governance.”
One is mindful of Byron’s (2003: 12) contention:
Significantly, in Newfoundland policy making is concentrated in St. John’s. There is no
county or district level administration with substantial devolved powers and responsibilities.
The provincial government’s power to define the terms of developmental problems and to
apply the solutions that it deems appropriate has not, heretofore, been tempered by a need to
respond to, or to negotiate with, lower levels of representative government. . . . An evident
reluctance to abandon a monopoly on policy making continues to foster a top-down ap-
proach from St. John’s, despite the contemporary rhetoric of local empowerment.
Within a political culture that this suggests, and one that the development history of
the province would tend to substantiate, the authority and responsibility devolved
to the Regional Economic Development Boards must be seen as both substantive
and substantial. They are in many respects daring and entrepreneurial. They consti-
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tute a significant experiment worthy of attention across Canada, America, Europe,
and elsewhere. Notwithstanding their qualities, the anecdotal and other impres-
sions of executive directors and Board members “run off their feet” are cause for re-
flection. Likewise, the mixed record of REDB performance that has been regarded
“as good as could be expected” given the resources applied to the project and given
the counterpart performance of provincial and federal partners also provides cause
for reflection.
The formal mandate to facilitate, co-ordinate, and provide leadership for the
strategic planning process for regional economic development and to function in
the implementation of this development strategy is an onerous charge. Especially
demanding is its formalizing in a binding performance contract made even more so
when the success of the tripartite role is essentially dependent on the goodwill, en-
ergy, conviction, and cohesion of a small group of (likely over-extended) volun-
teers in the rural region.
The Boards have had to invent themselves, from active RDAs in the regions,
from local municipalities, labour organizations, educational organizations, busi-
ness organizations, and others. They have had to actualize governance systems.
They have had to enter into a formal strategic planning process for the design and
implementation of a development plan for their region. They have had to recruit
and maintain staff. They have had to enter into a plethora of alliances and networks
to explore, promote, and otherwise move ahead a great variety of development pro-
jects. They have had to deal with a changing roster of federal and provincial pro-
grams, projects, and personnel. They have had to develop and maintain a
legitimacy and relevance in and for their regional constituencies.
Given the resources made available to the REDBs, essentially for operations
and maintenance purposes, and the absence of immediately accessible develop-
ment funding, one would have to question the long-term sustainability of the cur-
rent arrangement. While several REDBs may have close working relationships with
a CBDC working in their region, these relationships have to be individually negoti-
ated; they are not assured. Furthermore, the business development funding re-
sources potentially available through them are by statute within the control of the
CBDCs. The REDBs essentially have no core resources for development manage-
ment. The gap between the high expectations for the REDBs to lead, facilitate, and
co-ordinate development implementation, in addition to doing so for planning, and
the inadequacy of the resources available for the former function suggests an area
requiring immediate attention.
How does this situation redound on governance potentials? Given the scarcity
of development resources, the first impression might be that as a consequence, the
imperative for co-operation and collaboration will be sufficient incentive to propel
the development of governance structures (for “power with” to get to “power to”)
and related process. And there is already evidence of extensive networking and
inter-organizational activity across most regions. Likewise, the incentive to fash-
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ion ways and means to move towards “power to” conditions, as against “power
over,” is likely to be significant given the emergence of yet another new regional
structure and associated power bases in the Rural Secretariat. On the other hand,
new organizations often have a period of muscle-flexing to secure their formal turf,
which might militate against significant horizontal overtures for co-operation and
resource sharing, at least for an initial period. Emerging evidence is that of munici-
palities playing a more vigorous role in rural development beyond conventional
municipal functions (e.g., land-use-planning, physical infrastructure), either di-
rectly or through their organization, the Newfoundland and Labrador Federation of
Municipalities. However, rural municipalities are not guaranteed the requisite re-
sources to be fully effective partners (Douglas, 2003). In sum, the question re-
mains: will the numerous challenges faced by the REDBs suggested here provide the
spark to ignite and sustain the emergent governance systems already evident in ru-
ral regions, or will they extinguish the spark through jealously protected domains
and an REDB system devoid of any credible local development implementation and
co-ordination resources, including governance investment resources.
IRELAND: PARTNERSHIP IN GOVERNANCE
The emergence and consolidation of LEADER and Local Development Partnerships
in Ireland have come about against the backdrop of a weak system of local govern-
ment, a political system characterized by clientelism and a centralized state (Roche,
1982; Barrington, 1991; Gallagher et al., 2001; Callanan and Keogan, 2003). En-
dogenous actors, mainly from the community and voluntary sector and the Euro-
pean Union have combined to give Ireland a complex, yet competent set of locally
based bodies that enable local development and have strengthened local gover-
nance. Thus, in less than two decades, Ireland has gone from being fairly character-
ized as having a large vacuum in local governance to a situation in which the
country now has a number of interrelated sets of local governance structures. In-
deed, the Irish experience in promoting local development is frequently presented
as a model that newer democracies in Central and Eastern Europe can emulate
(Ahner, 2004; ÖIR, 2006). Ireland’s local development partnerships have been par-
ticularly successful in promoting a bottom-up approach to development, based on
extensive local consultations and citizen participation.
In addition to providing supports and services to specific target groups,2 the
partnerships implemented a number of strategies to enhance citizen (and more spe-
cifically, target group) participation in local decision-making. New community
structures were established in areas where none previously existed, while existing
groups were facilitated to expand their membership and become more representa-
tive of disadvantaged sectors. Partnerships also developed their own structures.
They established community forums to promote inter-community networking, and
in many instances these forums elected representatives to the board of the partner-
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ship or community group. Boards and sub-committees also recruited representa-
tives from each of the program target groups. LEADER resources for animation and
capacity-building have promoted inter-community co-operation and networking,
thus complementing efforts under the successive Local Development Programmes.
Under the LEADER I Programme community and voluntary associations repre-
sented less than 25 per cent of project promoters. Under the LEADER+ Programme
they have accounted for almost 50 per cent of promoters.
At the local level the community and voluntary sector has been the main driver
in the establishment and maintenance of area-based development in LEADER and
Area Partnerships. In several instances the local business community and agricul-
tural interests, such as producer co-operatives, were instrumental in getting organi-
zations off the ground. They provided financial support and professional expertise
to a number of the emerging LEADER groups and assisted them in formulating busi-
ness plans. While the central state was, albeit due to EU influences, generally sup-
portive of the fledgling partnerships, the same cannot be said of local government
in Ireland. Indeed, many within the local government sector viewed the partner-
ships as a rival, and some advocated that local authorities rather than LEADER
Boards should be responsible for the disbursal of project funds (Lynch, 1996).
Many within the local development sector were no less critical of local govern-
ment, which they associated with poor public service provision and the neglect of
disadvantaged communities. A number of partnerships included a clause in their ar-
ticles of association that excluded local authority officials or members from their
boards. Thus, in terms of participation in and formation of area-based partnerships
(LEADER and others, such as the APCs), the situation in Ireland contrasted with that
of Newfoundland and Labrador, where municipal authorities were from the outset
much more supportive of local development.
Since the mid-1990s reforms of Ireland’s local government system have con-
tributed to greater interaction between local government and local development.
Local authorities have established sub-structures that facilitate inputs into deci-
sion-making by interests outside local government, including the productive sector
and community and voluntary associations. In response to the OECD review (Sabel,
1996) of Irish partnership, which had pointed to their “fragile democratic legiti-
macy,” the government in 1999 obliged all LEADER and Local Development Part-
nerships (i.e., APCs and others) to include at least two elected local authority
representatives on their board of directors. It was anticipated that this step would
strengthen the democratic accountability of the local development sector. Local au-
thorities were obliged in turn to include local development representatives on their
Strategic Policy Committees. While a subsequent commentary on Irish partner-
ships (OECD, 2001) did not address this issue specifically, an examination of the
projects promoted by LEADER and Local Development Partnerships since 1999
clearly reveals a continuous increase in the number of projects facilitated and deliv-
ered in conjunction with local authorities, particularly in the areas of the mainte-
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nance and management of residential areas, village enhancement, and the provision
of recreational spaces in communities. A number of environmental projects have
also been promoted based on collaborative approaches. Thus, local government is
becoming increasingly visible as a partner and is becoming absorbed into local de-
velopment.
Reviews of the Local Development Programme (LDP) and the Local Develop-
ment Social Inclusion Programme (LDSIP), by Goodbody Economic Consultants
(2002a, 2002b) and by Haase (2005), record that APCs and CPs had exceeded their
targets. These achievements were most evident in respect to the individuals and
groups supported, and the level of social capital development at the local level.
However, Turok (2001) questions the extent to which partnerships have actually
succeeded in promoting significant change among the public-sector bodies, espe-
cially with regard to their pooling of resources so as to be more effective in target-
ing social exclusion. Similarly, Scott (2004) has pointed to the need to place greater
emphasis on mainstreaming. The Community Workers’ Cooperative (CWC, 2000:
40) pointed to the need for state agency personnel to “improve appreciation of com-
munity development.” Haase and McKeown (2003) express stringent criticism of
mainstream agencies that have been reluctant to buy into the concept and practice
of partnerships. Indeed, they criticize initiatives such as RAPID3 and CLÁR,4 which
they claim “operate in isolation, generally failing to avail of the knowledge and
experience of the existing area-based partnerships” (2003: 25). While these obser-
vations point up anomalies in the state’s perceptions of local governance arrange-
ments, developments over recent years give cause for optimism regarding the
sustainability of local partnerships. The state is increasingly recognizing the capac-
ity of civil society to organize itself and manage local development. Since 2001 the
Irish government has invested over $500 million to address the shortage of child-
care places in Ireland. The bulk of this funding has been allocated to community as-
sociations, most of which have benefited from the advice and guidance provided by
the local development sector. A national rural transport program has been rolled out
through the local development sector, and the government is currently in the pro-
cess of outsourcing a social/economy/community services program to the sector.
Thus, while the vertical dimension of governance relations in Ireland has been its
most challenging aspect to date, the out-sourcing arrangements referred to here sig-
nal a gradual willingness on the part of the state to share power and responsibilities
with other actors. Moreover, Ireland has allocated a greater percentage of CAP Pillar
Two resources to LEADER than has any other EU member state for the period 2007 to
2013. The challenge for the local development sector lies in ensuring that increased
responsibilities are matched with increased resources. It should be noted, however,
that while Ireland’s partnerships have been endowed with significantly greater re-
sources than their counterparts in Newfoundland and Labrador, this did not occur
generically, but rather as a result of pro-active efforts on the parts of a number of
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partnerships to source funding that would complement their core program(s), and
which would enable them to further rural development objectives.
Ongoing reforms of local government pose both challenges and opportunities
for local partnerships. One aspect in particular, which has been promoted jointly by
the Department of the Environment, Heritage, and Local Government and the De-
partment of Community, Rural, and Gaeltacht Affairs, has come to be known as
“cohesion.” This seeks to re-align the boundaries of local development agencies to
coincide with those of local government. Cohesion has posed difficulties for a num-
ber of LEADER and Local Development Groups, which had been operating on en-
dogenously defined, rather than administratively defined delineations. Cohesion
also requires LEADER and Local Development Partnerships, which had been operat-
ing separately (each with its own Board of Directors), but within the same or over-
lapping catchment territory to come together to form a single structure, that is:
organizational integration. While the process of cohesion may pose short-term
challenges for particular groups and individuals, who fear a loss of autonomy or
status, it must be seen as part of a broader move towards the realization of integra-
tion and multi-sectorality at the local level (Westholm, 1999; ÖIR, 2004), that will
contribute to strengthening the local development sector and make it a permanent,
more visible and stronger player in rural development. A number of actors in local
development object to what they perceive as a top-down imposition of cohesion,
and point to the lack of consultation that accompanied the commencement of the
process. Cohesion has also been marked by concerns that longer-established orga-
nizations would subsume smaller and newer ones. While these concerns are legiti-
mate, in the context of local governance, cohesion ought to be promoted as a means
of ensuring that local development reduces its reliance on short-term funding cy-
cles, so that long-term strategic planning for territorial development is enabled.
CONCLUSION
The Irish experience points to the importance of permitting local autonomy in the
design and implementation of rural development. The global grant system, through
which partnerships have the freedom to approve or reject projects and allocate re-
sources within specified guidelines but without having to refer to regional or na-
tional authorities, has increased their ability to innovate. This arrangement has
coupled financial accountability with local governance, encouraged a high level of
transparency, and represents a positive aspect of rural development in Ireland rela-
tive to Newfoundland and Labrador. Nevertheless, systems for evaluation, moni-
toring, and reporting to funding bodies (government departments and the EU) tend
to emphasize quantitative outputs, with the result that partnerships are tempted to
pay greater attention to short-term or high-visibility projects rather than investing
in stimulating and supporting citizen participation in local governance, which re-
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quires longer-term commitment, particularly in disadvantaged and peripheral com-
munities.
Horizontal linkages between agents of local governance in Ireland need ongo-
ing attention. The cohesion process will consolidate structures and advance
multi-sectoral and integrated approaches to local development, and significantly
reduce inter-partnership competition in particular areas. These new structures will
be challenged to maintain a bottom-up orientation, in the light of government pro-
posals to increase the level of the state sector and local government participation
therein. The strengthening of inter-partnership networking has the potential to see
partnerships making greater contributions to economic and social policy, and to
promote the emergence of more formal linkages between national and local social
partnership. Thus, while the cohesion process directly addresses the spatial dimen-
sion of current complexities, it needs to be followed by a process that formalizes the
participation by local governance structures in arrangements that shape and influ-
ence the macro- and meso-level policy contexts in which they operate.
NOTES
1. In 2001 the EU heads of government at a Council meeting in Lisbon agreed on a series of
steps, with the objective of making the EU the most competitive global economic space.
Two years later, this was supplemented by an agreement under the Swedish presidency
of the EU (at Gothenburg) that incorporated the principles of sustainable environmental
development into the Lisbon strategy.
2. The Programme Handbook (ADM, 1995) specifically listed the following target groups:
long-term unemployed, other unemployed, low-income farm families, lone parents,
youth at risk, travellers (ethnic minority indigenous to Ireland), disadvantaged women,
people with disabilities, homeless people.
3. RAPID — Revitalising Areas through Planning, Investment and Development — was
launched by the government in 2001, and is aimed at improving the quality of life and op-
portunities available to residents in the most disadvantaged urban communities.
Twenty-five target urban areas have been selected. RAPID’s objectives are to promote so-
cial inclusion, tackle spatial concentrations of unemployment, and stem the social and
economic costs of social exclusion. The program seeks to promote collaboration be-
tween local communities, agencies, and government departments. It is administered by
ADM, on behalf of the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs.
4. CLÁR (Ceantair Laga Árd Riachtanais) is an initiative promoted by Minister Eamon O
Cuiv, and launched in 2001. CLÁR seeks to promote the regeneration of disadvantaged
rural areas. Initially, 16 disadvantaged rural areas were selected on the basis of having
lost over 50 per cent of their population since the foundation of the state. Following the
publication of the 2002 census of population figures, these 16 areas were expanded and
additional ones were added. The objective of CLÁR is to ensure the prioritization of these
areas in the allocation of resources under the national development. Further information
on RAPID and CLÁR is available from the Department of Community, Rural and
Gaeltacht Affairs: <www.pobail.ie>.
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